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 Lobbying and the responsible firm: Agenda-setting for a freshly-
conceptualized field 
 
 
Abstract 
‘Responsible lobbying’ is an increasingly-salient topic within business and management.   We make 
a contribution to the literature on ‘responsible lobbying’ in three ways.  First, we provide novel 
definitions and, thereby, make a clear distinction between lobbying and corporate political activity.  
We then define responsible lobbying with respect to its content, process, organization, and 
environment, resulting in a typology of responsible lobbying, a conceptual model that informs the 
rest of the paper. Second, the paper provides a thematic overview of the current literature 
underpinning lobbying and the responsible firm, and the underlying paradigms informing this 
literature. Third, the paper makes specific suggestions for a future research agenda, ending with a 
consideration of methodological implications of such research. 
 
 
 
 
 
 Introduction 
Lobbying is often regarded as a ‘dirty business’ of back-room deals amongst powerful, corrupt 
‘special interests’ (Mills, 1956), raising questions as to whether lobbying should even be allowed 
(Dahan, Hadani, & Schuler, 2013; on the governance of corporate political activity).  Nevertheless, 
lobbying is firmly established in public life (see Oberman, 2004, p. 246) and has been defended on 
grounds of legitimacy and improved public policymaking (Dahl, 1982). Our paper examines the 
basis on which a firm could lobby in a responsible manner.  
 
This is important for at least four reasons. First, lobbying can be irresponsible in ways that are 
harmful to social wellbeing (e.g., blocking regulatory attempts to reduce the negative externalities 
of business, misleading decision-makers in an effort to lower company costs). Second, firms can 
lose legitimacy if they are perceived to abuse the political process for their own self-interest 
(Grimaldi, 1998), particularly if they otherwise have a responsible reputation (Finnemore, 2009). 
Moreover, persistent public skepticism of lobbying arguably undermines trust in the political 
process more generally. Third, “the lack of systematic attention to lobbying is a noticeable gap in 
the [CSR] literature” (Anastasiadis, 2014, p. 264), and the failure to address lobbying weakens the 
CSR field (Bauer (2014). Fourth, without a clear notion of responsible lobbying, practitioners may 
focus on partial or inappropriate solutions. Transparency is an example of a partial solution, which 
we address in this paper (but see also the UK government’s anti-lobbying policy on public funding; 
Wright, 2016). For these reasons, we consider the complex relationship between lobbying and the 
responsible firm to be an interesting area of research. 
 
The past decade has seen a steep increase in scholarship on the topic of responsible business and 
politics generally, notably with a move towards political CSR (Scherer & Palazzo, 2011; also 
Palazzo & Scherer, 2006), within which there is also growing interest in lobbying and the 
responsible firm (e.g., Bauer, 2016; 2017; den Hond, Rehbein, de Bakker, & Kooijmans-van 
Langveld, 2014; previously, Moon, Crane, & Matten, 2004). The increase in scholarly interest in 
 lobbying and the responsible firm, coupled with persistent public skepticism, suggest that now is an 
opportune time for a conceptual reassessment that addresses the extant literature and the underlying 
paradigms governing conceptions of politics and lobbying. These paradigms are interesting, 
because they inform existing, disparate conversations on responsible lobbying. Moreover, despite 
the interest in lobbying and the responsible firm, much of the scholarship associated with this 
interest addresses CSR and lobbying as two separate phenomena. That is, it is concerned with the 
interactions between CSR and lobbying with respect to such issues as trust (Liedong, Ghobadian, 
Rajwani, & O’Regan, 2015) or debt financing (Liedong & Rajwani, 2017). The present paper is 
concerned with responsible lobbying; that is, the actions of organizations as they seek to influence 
the frameworks within which firms engage in market-related activities. The paper thus makes a 
substantive contribution to this particular field of investigation. 
 
This paper contributes, first, by clarifying what is meant by lobbying, proposing working definitions 
of both lobbying and responsible lobbying, and distinguishing between corporate political activity 
(CPA) and lobbying. Secondly, our working definition of responsible lobbying forms a conceptual 
framework underpinned by existing perspectives in the literature, and leads to the first 
comprehensive overview of the fast-growing literature on lobbying and the responsible firm. 
Thirdly, we propose a research agenda, which we conclude with a discussion of methodological 
considerations. We anticipate the paper being of value both to practitioners and researchers in 
management and political science.   
 
Defining corporate lobbying and responsible lobbying 
CPA and lobbying are often treated as synonyms (e.g., Doh, Lawton, & Rajwani, 2012; Lawton, 
McGuire, & Rajwani, 2013; Lux, Crook, & Woehr, 2011). Whilst both are clearly part of a firm’s 
non-market strategy (Baron, 2006), we consider the conflation to be unhelpful for conceptualizing 
responsible lobbying. After defining corporate lobbying, we elaborate on the significance of the 
conceptual separation between CPA and lobbying. In so doing, we make a distinction between 
 direct actions (undertaken by company officers) and indirect actions (undertaken on behalf of the 
firm). We then present a working definition of responsible lobbying. 
 
There has been little agreement about the precise nature of lobbying. Definitions tend to be 
contradictory and partial (e.g., Hansen & Mitchell, 2000, p. 893; Hillman, 2003, p. 463; Hojnacki & 
Kimball, 1998, pp. 777–778). Baron’s definition of lobbying (2006, p. 232, emphasis in original) 
provides a useful starting point: 
The strategic communication of politically relevant information to 
government officeholders. 
 
However, we consider Baron’s focus on the recipients of lobbying (government officeholders) to be 
too narrow. Policymaking engages a range of actors in a ‘policy soup’ (see Kingdon, 1984, pp. 21 & 
77; also Richardson, 1996) and, as such, concepts and policies are generated in communities of 
practice, with diverse actors able to influence outcomes. We also consider Baron to include too wide 
a range of possible actors who engage in lobbying. We therefore modify Baron’s definition to 
reflect the complex nature of the political process, whilst focusing on a narrower set of actors: 
Corporate lobbying is the strategic communication of politically relevant 
information by officers of a corporation to those political actors who have the 
power to substantially influence public policy outcomes in that policy-making 
environment. 
 
In contrast, CPA can be defined as, “any business effort to influence public policy” (Windsor, 2006, 
p. 6). Whilst this includes lobbying, it also encompasses other activities, such as political 
advertising, financial contributions, political action committees, legal action (e.g., to challenge 
executive action), commissioning third-party lobbyists, stakeholder management, political 
campaigning (e.g., to support corporate narratives on climate change; see Wright & Nyberg, 2015), 
and even charitable contributions (Schlozman & Tierney, 1986, p. 150; see Werner, 2012, p. 4). The 
literature typically considers lobbying as a central subset of CPA (Bonardi, Hillman, & Keim, 2005; 
Bonardi & Keim, 2005; Coen, 1998; Hillman, 2003; Hojnacki & Kimball, 1998). Nonetheless, 
 lobbying and CPA are frequently treated as interchangeable in the literature, which is why this paper 
draws on work that refers to both CPA and lobbying.  
 
We suggest that there are four substantive reasons to make the distinction between lobbying and 
CPA. First, both the nature of responsibility and the tools to promote responsible action are better-
understood and better developed for many other elements of CPA than they are for lobbying. This is 
partly because of the role of corporate spending, to which much of the CPA literature is related. But 
whilst financial contributions are relatively simple to identify and regulate, lobbying costs are 
largely related to staff and maintaining office space in political centers.  Whereas principles for 
responsible lobbying (including, e.g., codes of conduct) can be formally stated, ethical breaches are 
arguably subtler, and harder to regulate (see also Rasche, 2010, on the limits of standards). 
 
Second, lobbying is intrinsically relational, distinguishing it from aspects of CPA, illustrated by 
Hillman and Hitt’s (1999, p. 833) identification of a fundamental choice between relational and 
transactional approaches to CPA. Guo (2009) links lobbying to a longer-term relational approach 
and financial contributions to shorter-term perspectives. Work that conflates lobbying and CPA can 
obscure such distinctions. For example, den Hond and colleagues (2014, p. 793) refer to “CPA” as 
relational by definition, before (p. 798) drawing on Hillman and Hitt (1999) to indicate that firms 
can take a “relational” approach to CPA. Similarly, Lock and Seele (2016) also discuss CPA rather 
than lobbying in their recent paper on deliberative lobbying as a means of aligning CSR and CPA. 
Moreover, lobbying can influence whether a regulatory proposal emerges at all (e.g., Mahoney, 
2008; Mazey & Richardson, 2001, pp. 219–220). The agenda-setting aspect of lobbying, in 
particular, requires a longer-term, relational approach; a view well-supported by both the academic 
literature (Baumgartner, Berry, Hojnacki, Kimball, & Leech, 2009; Coen & Thatcher, 2008; Coen & 
Willman, 1998) and by practitioners (Eppink, 2007; Reich, 1998).  
 
 The third element in our conceptualization of corporate lobbying concerns the actors involved. We 
view third-party influencing on behalf of a firm – by public affairs consultants, or even industry 
associations – differently from actions by corporate officers. Third parties, such as trade 
associations, clearly matter in the political process (and more widely; see Lawton, Rajwani, & 
Minto, 2017), and third-party influencing is of course a highly relevant aspect of a firm’s political 
engagement.  However, it is a categorically different activity from company lobbying. That is, we 
consider corporate lobbying to only be carried out by the organization itself, involving actions 
undertaken directly by officers of the corporation. Third-party lobbying, commissioned to a greater 
or lesser extent by, but not fully under the control of, an individual firm, is a different phenomenon. 
In a sense, third-party lobbying is part of the firm’s ‘political supply chain’ – that is, it is an 
important activity that is externally-sourced – and we consider such third party lobbying to be more 
properly an element of CPA.1   
 
By contrast, firms have greater control over their own staff, in terms of who and how they lobby, as 
well as what they communicate when doing so. This is particularly important, given the relational 
nature of lobbying. For example, an in-house lobbyist develops relations with policymakers on 
behalf of her or his organization directly, whereas a third-party lobbyist represents numerous 
interests, either consecutively (as in consultants) or simultaneously (as in trade associations). We 
note that public affairs consultancies in Europe have been, “viewed with some scepticism by both 
companies – wary of delegating their interests to independents – and Commission officials who 
prefer to avoid speaking to ‘hired hands’” (McLaughlin, Jordan, & Maloney, 1993, p. 194).  
Consequently, such third-parties typically provide “specialist information and continuous political 
monitoring,” rather than engaging directly on behalf of firms that have established their own 
lobbying presence (Coen, 1997, p. 23).  
 
                                                 
1 Inasmuch as smaller firms tend to be represented politically by their industry/trade associations, ‘corporate lobbying’ 
is a doubly-accurate term, as it can be considered the preserve of larger corporations.  
 The distinction between in-house and third-party lobbying is particularly relevant in material and/or 
controversial cases in which a given industry is disunited and its trade association thus rendered 
relatively ineffective (e.g., the automotive industry in the case of CO2 regulation in the European 
Union; see Anastasiadis, 2014; Reed, 2007). Additionally, in-house lobbyists may lobby in a more 
responsible manner than third-parties (Bauer 2017, pp. 274, 318). An organization’s specific 
choices on what particular policy issues should be dealt with by whom is therefore an interesting, 
but separate question. We posit that the more material an issue is for an organization, the more 
likely it is to seek to address it via in-house lobbying. Such a view is supported by Coen’s (1997; 
1998) account of the evolution of in-house lobbying in Europe, which emerged from reliance on 
third-party actors to the development of in-house expertise as the European Union increasingly 
affected their core interests.  
 
The fourth substantive reason for distinguishing between lobbying and CPA relates to the 
particularities of lobbying. Lobbying content involves provision of information, often expressed in 
technical reports and position papers. By contrast, CPA can involve a range of ‘products’, such as 
legal argument or specie. The processes involved are also different. For example, political 
advertising may appeal to emotions (compared with lobbying, in which rational argument is highly 
valued; see Anastasiadis, 2014), and litigation is inherently conflictual, in contrast to the more 
relational and cooperative lobbying (see above; also Coen, 1998). Moreover, lobbying is an activity 
conducted directly by the organization rather than by third parties, as already discussed. 
Furthermore, lobbying occurs in a particular policymaking environment, with its own rules of 
engagement. CPA, by contrast, occurs across the full panoply of environments. An example of this 
corporate political advocacy, which Wettstein and Baur (2016, notably pp. 200-203) develop using 
the case of Ben & Jerry’s (and other companies’) campaign in favor of same-sex marriage rights, 
which included publicity-generating actions like temporarily renaming an ice-cream. Other 
examples include stakeholder management and legal action. 
 Having clarified ‘corporate lobbying’ and distinguished it from CPA, we now turn to responsible 
lobbying. Any definition must allow the following question to be addressed: how are the 
responsibility attributes of a particular complex action to be judged (and by whom)? Developing a 
view of responsible lobbying therefore requires attention to framework conditions for lobbying, 
both inside the company and in the political arena within which lobbying occurs, in addition to the 
more obvious content and process of specific lobbying. We therefore build on newly-emerging 
literature (notably Anastasiadis, 2010; Bauer, 2014) to propose the following working definition, 
which directly informs the conceptual framework: 
Responsible corporate lobbying involves attention to four components: 
Content – promoting social good through public policy means; Process – 
adhering to ethical standards acceptable to all parties involved; 
Organization – the lobbying function is integrated into the firm, and the firm 
is respectful of the political process; and Environment – promoting an 
enabling context in which to lobby in a responsible manner. 
 
In our examination of the literature, we found both normatively-focused and practice-focused 
elements, and a dichotomy between research addressing the act of lobbying and that concerned with 
the conditions under which lobbying occurs (i.e. lobbying context). We have, therefore, developed a 
framework that encompasses these elements, presented in Table 1. Note that there is a conceptual 
overlap between normative and practical aspects, represented by dotted lines in the Table. 
 
 
Table 1: Typology of lobbying and the responsible firm: Conceptual model 
Typology of 
responsible lobbying 
 
Components 
 
Content Process Organization 
External 
environment 
Orientation 
Normative 
focus 
    
Practical 
mechanisms 
    
Aspect of lobbying 
Operational lobbying: 
The act of lobbying 
Conditions for lobbying: 
Lobbying context 
 
 
  
Paradigms of responsibility 
Lobbying is not well-represented in the CSR literature. For example, CSR literature reviews have 
tended to not address lobbying at all (e.g., Carroll & Shabana, 2010; Garriga & Melé, 2004; Lee, 
2008). We argue that the paradigms that dominate CSR can be used to both conceptualize – and 
limit conceptions of – responsible lobbying. The manner in which CSR is conceptualized is 
therefore of fundamental importance to the meaning of responsible lobbying. 
We consider the conceptualization of CSR as intrinsically discretionary, notwithstanding an 
increase of government policies for CSR (see below), to be highly significant. It is widely 
considered that corporate responsibilities encompass a range of “expectations placed on 
organizations by society” (Carroll & Buchholz, 2000, p. 35), which are met in “actions that appear 
to further some social good, beyond the interests of the firm and that which is required by law” 
(McWilliams & Siegel, 2001, p. 117). Indeed, CSR is widely considered as “a form of self-
regulation to contribute to [societal] welfare” (Moon, 2007, p. 298). In short, the literature largely 
emphasizes voluntarism (e.g., Brammer, Jackson, & Matten, 2012), a focus retained in the emerging 
political CSR literature (Rasche, 2015; also Whelan, 2012). Conceptualizations of CSR as 
inherently discretionary are congruent with a wider preference for a political dispensation in which 
state power is to be curtailed (see ‘self-regulation,’ below). In such a preference, regulation is to be 
avoided wherever possible, in favor of voluntary actions. This helps to explain why ‘self-regulation’ 
features in this paper as one approach to responsible lobbying. 
 
Furthermore, Western corporations now operate within the context of an economic model, in which 
self-interest is a fundamental value (e.g., Ferraro, Pfeffer, & Sutton, 2005; Wang, Malhotra, & 
Murnighan, 2011). CSR literature has not been immune to this.  For example, Lee (2008) notes that 
the approach underpinning CSR literature has changed over time, from mostly-normative to mostly-
instrumental. Indeed, Kinderman (2012) shows how CSR and neo-liberalism co-evolved in the UK. 
 Such a context is congruent with a generalized resistance to government rules (see Anastasiadis, 
2014; also Singer’s call for better understanding of companies’ assumptions). 
 
Related literatures 
Two important debates within the CSR literature explore firms’ political power, but without being 
directly relevant to lobbying: we have therefore excluded them from the scope of this paper. The 
first addresses the state’s relationship with CSR (e.g., Midttun, 2008; Steurer, 2010; also, Zhao, 
2012). That debate is focused on private authority, on the potential for relational governance in CSR 
programs, and on firms’ strategic use of CSR to manage relationships with governments. There has 
been some interesting recent work in this area. For example, Knudsen and Brown (2015) argue that 
state involvement in CSR is mutually-beneficial to business and government (also Dentchev, van 
Baelen & Haezendonck, 2015; Knudsen & Moon, 2017). Knudsen, Moon and Slager (2015) present 
the results of a Europe-wide analysis of government policy on CSR. The states-and-CSR literature 
can be read together with the varieties of capital literature, which has received some attention with 
respect to CSR (e.g., Matten & Moon, 2008). Nonetheless, it is more focused on governments’ 
influence on CSR than on the manner in which corporations engage with public policy.  
 
The second debate is on political perspectives on CSR; the focus being on corporate accountability 
under conditions of globalization and government retreat (or absence). This debate has two main 
strands (following Whelan, 2012). The corporate citizenship strand is about firms’ roles in the lives 
of individuals, in particular in a context of governmental absence (e.g., Crane, Matten, & Moon, 
2008; Matten & Crane, 2005). The political CSR strand is concerned with an updated political 
economics in a post-Westphalian context (Scherer & Palazzo, 2007, 2011). Whelan’s (2012) critical 
review of these political perspectives usefully cautions that theoretical developments should remain 
compatible with firms’ profit motive. Lobbying has been beyond the scope of this political literature 
stream (e.g., Palazzo & Scherer’s, 2008, p. 581, “mere lobbyism”). Recent work by Rasche (2015) 
 starts to bring together the literatures on CPA (which he identifies as mainly North American) and 
political CSR (characterized as predominantly European). 
 
 
Perspectives on responsible lobbying 
Having provided a conceptual frame for responsible lobbying, we present four perspectives on 
lobbying and the responsible firm. To this end, we distinguish between mostly-normative (ethical 
frameworks and contextual perspectives) and mostly-practical approaches (self-regulation and 
transparency) to responsible lobbying. 
 
Table 1 presented a typology of lobbying and the responsible firm. We now provide an overview of 
the literature to flesh out this Table. Our guiding question was, “What does the literature tell us 
about lobbying and the responsible firm?” To answer that question, we examined work published 
between 1995 and 2015. In reviewing the literature we took three steps. First, we conducted 
keyword searches using EBSCOhost’s Business Source Complete database, for papers in scholarly, 
peer-reviewed journals, January 1995 – December 2015, as indicated in Table 2. There were 
broadly two types of term: those relating to political action and those referring to corporate 
responsibility. Keyword searches referenced each ‘political’ keyword against each ‘responsibility’ 
keyword, rendering 35 binary keyword searches in total. Searches rendered between 41 
(lobby*/CSR) and 4703 (regulation/respons*) hits, though many of these appeared multiple times. 
Where a two-term search returned over 500 hits, we conducted a refined search (e.g. “political 
activity” and “ethics” rendered 531 hits; adding “corp*” rendered 200). We discounted multi-term 
searches returning over 500 hits on the grounds that they were insufficiently-precise. We then 
scanned each paper’s title and Abstract to check for relevance, before reading all relevant papers.  
 
The second main aspect of the literature review was a manual search for relevant papers in leading 
social science journals since 1995 (in CSR/business ethics, general management, and political 
 science; again, as indicated in Table 2). Third, we tracked key citations, ensuring that we included 
other relevant literature, such as books and practitioner literature. This final step proved significant, 
as there was a substantial gap in focus between the academic and practitioner literature, with 
academic work largely taking a normative focus and practitioner mechanisms being more interested 
in practical mechanisms. Including both types of literature enabled us to develop a comprehensive 
picture. The above process rendered 344 works, though substantially fewer than that were useful for 
our paper (our manuscript contains 148 references in total).  
 
 
Table 2: Keyword search for this review 
Type of literature Examples of journal Keywords used (context-specific) 
Business ethics / CSR 
Journal of Business Ethics 
Business Ethics Quarterly 
Business Ethics: European 
Review 
CPA-related keywords 
Lobby*  
Advoc* 
CPA 
Political action  
Political activity 
Politics 
Regulation 
 
CSR-related keywords 
CSR  
Ethics 
Corporate responsibility 
Governance 
Responsib* 
Governance 
Corporate Governance 
Corporate Governance: An 
International Review 
Political science 
Public Administration Review 
Journal of Public Affairs 
Journal of European Public 
Policy 
American Political Science 
Review 
General management 
Administrative Science 
Quarterly 
Academy of Management 
Review 
Journal of Management Studies 
Strategic Management Journal 
California Management Review 
Harvard Business Review 
International Journal of 
Management Reviews 
Other social science sources 
American Sociological Review 
Socio-Economic Review 
  
 Four distinct lenses emerged from the literature, through which the relationship between lobbying 
and the responsible firm has been viewed. These result from our analysis of the available literature: 
they are grounded in, the data, and are emergent after analysis (coding) and theoretical 
interpretation2. Our multiple-iterative analysis process was influenced by the seven-step operation 
that Spiggle (1994, pp. 493-496) proposes for qualitative data: categorization, abstraction, 
comparison, dimensionalization, integration, iteration, and refutation. It is conceptually related to 
the structured (from scientific disciplines: see Bowen, 2009) or systematic (from medicine: see 
Tranfield, Denyer, & Smart, 2003) literature review, and is similar in practice to the process 
adopted in a recent study on extremism (Moufahim, Reedy, & Humphreys, 2015) in which the 
authors write “During each of these stages of analysis we discussed emergent ideas and wrote a set 
of memos to record our analytical process” (p. 98). Massaro and colleagues (2016, p. 769, Figure 1) 
present a useful continuum, in which they place a rapid review (no rules) and structured literature 
review (rigid rules) at the two ends. Our approach lies between these two extremes, modifying the 
rigor of a structured literature review with the authors’ existing detailed and well-grounded 
knowledge of the CSR and lobbying fields (e.g., concerning the inclusion and interpretation of 
individual sources of literature). The coding process was followed by theoretical interpretation 
based on our “interpretive sensitivities” (Phillips & Hardy, 2002, p. 75) and finalized in discussion 
amongst the authors. Thus our overall approach could be described as “an iterative process in which 
ideas are used to make sense of data, and data used to change ideas” (Hammersley & Atkinson, 
2007, p. 158).  The specific steps in this process were as follows. One author read and re-read all 
the papers and developed initial codes. The other two authors each read half of the papers (selected 
randomly) and did the same. We then compared our coding in discussion and rationalized our 
results.  
 
                                                 
2 For further information, please see the accompanying online file. This provides a full bibliography in tabular form of 
the works consulted in preparing this paper, together with an indication of which of the four lenses a particular piece of 
work most closely fits.  
 Generally, ethical frameworks are normatively-focused and directly address the act of lobbying, 
whilst self-regulation and transparency frameworks address lobbying indirectly and are largely 
practice-focused; that is, they address directly-relevant topics, but without explicitly mentioning 
responsible lobbying. An additional group of literature approaches lobbying normatively in terms of 
the context within which lobbying occurs, typically focusing on deliberative approaches. This final 
group of literatures is newer and less well-developed than the other approaches and, we suggest, 
may be indicative of a new wave of normative scholarly interest in responsible lobbying. The 
framework presents four discrete categories. However, the boundaries are not impermeable. For 
example, self-regulation is a practical mechanism, often portrayed as instrumental, but it contains 
normative elements, and ethical frameworks often contain reference to practical mechanisms such 
as codes of conduct and/or transparency. There is clearly scope for further research to develop the 
framework, introducing greater nuance.  
 
 
Normative focus on responsible lobbying 
Ethical frameworks 
Most academics who engage explicitly with the topic of ‘responsible lobbying’ do so with reference 
to ethical frameworks. These are relevant to both the content and process of lobbying. Such 
normative work is mainly interested in the principles influencing the conduct of lobbying. 
Frameworks are theoretically elegant and are hence good for establishing principles against which 
actions are to be measured, and thus influencing organizations’ stated policies. However, ethical 
frameworks are also incomplete, as they do not typically consider the context within which 
lobbying occurs, and seldom lend themselves to practical mechanisms.  
 
Much of the earlier work on responsible lobbying appeared in Business Ethics Quarterly (BEQ). 
For example, Weber (1996) reflects on the ethics of lobbying and (1997) on appropriate practices 
for lobbying, Hamilton and Hoch (1997) present general standards for ethical lobbying, and Keffer 
 and Hill (1997) propose an ethical framework focused on lobbying impact on external stakeholders. 
Another notable contribution to this area is Oberman’s (2004) ethical framework, which is 
concerned with reducing the “real and perceived risk of business domination” (2004, p. 253), and 
which develops a tool for the ex-ante ethical analysis of lobbying action as practiced in a 
competitive environment, revolving around three ethical criteria: access, legitimation and influence 
in a contestable system. 
 
In one of the most comprehensive recent treatments of responsible lobbying, Ostas (2007) analyses 
the legal framework and ethics of lobbying in the United States. He considers whether lobbying 
should be a venue for “self-interested competition… for private gain, or … [rather, a venue for 
cooperating] with public officials to advance the public good” (ibid., pp. 43-44). In other words, 
should the lobbyist be an advocate (self-interested promotion, in the absence of a measurable, 
immutable public good), or should the lobbyist be a public citizen (i.e., promoting public good 
through civic duty)?  Ostas argues both normatively (“lobbyists must justify their actions with a 
normative reference to the common good;” ibid, p. 54), as well as pragmatically (in a pluralist 
environment, “the advocacy of self-interest is both expected and defensible;” idem.). This 
dichotomy nicely illustrates the central challenge of developing a normative model that will have 
practical application. To solve it, Ostas appears to rely on a view that the process of pluralist 
policymaking provides a sufficient guarantee of socially-valuable outcomes that firms are free to 
pursue their own self-interest. 
Ostas’s paper raises two kinds of question which are symptomatic of the weaknesses of ethical 
frameworks. First, how is the common good defined in a pluralist environment; i.e. on what basis 
can lobbying be judged to be ‘responsible’, and what is the role of power in doing so?  Second, 
what is the consequence of firms providing inaccurate information (content) whilst acting in an 
otherwise appropriate manner (correct process)? In answer to the first question, definitions of the 
common good can vary widely, even in the same political environment. We favor a discursive 
approach to answering the first question (see below). The second question receives some attention 
 elsewhere, with Baron’s (2006, p. 233) admonition against “crying wolf and making false claims.” 
Yet non-corporate actors perceive precisely such behavior from corporate lobbyists (as numerous 
news reports attest)3.  
 
Some recent change in the target of the normative-focused (and mainly academic) literature should 
be noted.  Whereas until 2013, ethical frameworks accounted for the clear majority of academic 
work on lobbying and the responsible firm, subsequently interest in the context of lobbying started 
to develop, and most recent papers have started to pay greater attention to this aspect. For those 
approaching the topic normatively, deliberative perspectives have increasingly become the preferred 
approach. Notwithstanding this recent trend, overall, ethical frameworks for lobbying have tended 
to focus on the act of lobbying, and the principal criticism of such frameworks is that they tend to 
be internally consistent, but not practicable. 
 
Context/Deliberative perspectives 
By contrast to earlier work, nearly all scholarly publications on responsible lobbying since 2014 
have been concerned with the context within which lobbying occurs, typically attending to 
deliberative perspectives. We speculate that this is part of a wider ‘deliberative turn’ in the social 
science literature, visible not only in political conceptions of CSR (see above), but also in political 
science (Dryzek, 2000; more specifically on lobbying: Greenwood, 2011; Gutmann & Thompson, 
2004) 4. The deliberative lens is visible in, and favored by, practitioner and researcher literatures. 
 
Work using the deliberative lens on lobbying has two commonalities. First, it considers that it is 
insufficient to examine the content or process of a company’s lobbying in the absence of the context 
within which that lobbying is taking place. Second, there is general convergence on the value of 
                                                 
3 An online search with such terms as “lobbyists deceive” renders hundreds of thousands of results, most of the first 
four pages of which relate to stories or reports of deceptive lobbying. 
4 Indeed, the only two doctoral theses of which we are aware that explicitly address responsible lobbying (Anastasiadis, 
2010; Bauer, 2017) both devote substantial chapters to deliberation. 
 deliberative principles (AccountAbility & The Global Compact, 2005; Anastasiadis 2014; Bauer 
2014; 2016; 2017).  Drawing on Habermas, Lock and Seele (2016) have promoted a deliberative 
approach as a means of explicitly reconciling CSR and CPA (including lobbying), which they 
clearly position as a normative stance (p. 419). Whilst we find the deliberative perspective 
promising, we see danger in an exclusive focus on Habermasian deliberative approaches, not least 
because it is hard to guarantee the prerequisite conditions for a Habermasian discourse ethic. 
Moreover, as Lock and Seele (2016, pp. 427-428) note, deliberative approaches are based on 
voluntariness, which is not unproblematic in the context of setting rules for business activities that 
generate external costs. Without greater clarity, deliberative perspectives could become similar to 
ethical frameworks in being theoretically elegant yet impracticable. Hence, we address questions of 
power in our later discussion. 
 
Rehbein and Schuler observe that the “decision process within the firm has by and large been 
overlooked” in lobbying research (1999, p. 145; also Lawton et al., 2013). Anastasiadis (2014) goes 
some way to addressing this empirical gap, presenting case study research on company-internal 
processes and developing a narrative model of corporate lobbying. He finds that “the CSR function 
has no role in lobbying” (ibid., p. 273) – suggesting that, in practice, firms’ CSR policies play “no 
role in the political arena” (idem). Instead, he argues, firms interact very differently with the 
political process depending on their dominant internal narrative.  Those which approach the 
political environment from an instrumental perspective tend to be hostile to regulation, whereas 
those taking a cooperative approach (a minority) will have a more sanguine view (see p. 285). He 
argues for change in companies’ lobbying, but seeks to integrate lobbying with corporate 
citizenship. Finally, Bauer’s (2014) approach to responsible lobbying (elaborated in Bauer 2017) is 
strongly influenced by a Habermasian deliberative approach. She develops a multidimensional 
model of responsible lobbying, based on “three content-related pillars” (congruence between CSR 
and lobbying; consideration of stakeholders; alignment with societal values), with “ethical, 
democratic dialogue” as the foundation for all three (2014, see Fig. 1, p. 66). Her approach has 
 similarities with that of Lock and Seele (2016). However, such a view presumes both that society’s 
values and objectives are unambiguous and easily-understood, and that corporate lobbying affects 
only the society within which the lobbying is taking place. Both assumptions are questionable. 
Notwithstanding the limitations of her work, Bauer’s contribution lays a useful foundation for 
future research in a promising area. 
 
Despite the recent surge in scholarly interest in deliberative perspectives, the total amount of 
literature on lobbying and the responsible firm with a normative focus is overshadowed by the 
literature addressing practical mechanisms. Generally, there are two lenses through which the 
practice-oriented literature views lobbying: self-regulation and transparency. Both of these tap into 
much wider discourses that have substantial motivational power. 
 
Practice-oriented focus on relevant areas 
Self-regulation 
Lobbying is not exclusively concerned with influencing regulation: it is also about more generally 
shaping the boundary conditions under which firms operate. Indeed, a substantial theme in lobbying 
is whether formal public policy is needed at all, and if so, in what form (e.g., regulation or market-
based-instruments). After all, much lobbying typically happens before a policy proposal emerges 
(Mazey & Richardson, 2001, pp. 219–220). We note that firms often consider government 
regulation to be undesirable per se, and favor voluntary approaches (see den Hond et al., 2014), a 
view clearly linked with a liberal-minimalist view of citizenship that stresses the protection of 
“individual citizens from arbitrary rule and oppression by government” (Stokes, 2002, p. 28). In the 
liberal-minimalist tradition, a ‘responsible’ firm might resist, and lobby for alternatives to, 
government regulation as a matter of principle. Self-regulation elides government rule-setting and is 
compatible with liberal-minimalism. Depending on the specifics, self-regulation can be relevant to 
practical mechanisms for the act of lobbying, as well as to the lobbying context. 
 
 Self-regulation can be sub-categorized into two classes. Voluntary commitments side-step or replace 
regulation by substituting corporate-generated content5. Codes of conduct on lobbying, by contrast, 
regulate individual behavior in the lobbying process. Both have an indirect perspective on lobbying 
and the responsible firm that is compatible with the neo-liberal economic perspective (for a 
trenchant critique, see Ghoshal, 2005). The thinking behind self-regulation is that it provides a more 
efficient means through which to achieve public policy goals. Civil society actors often argue that it 
is a way for firms to avoid their responsibilities, whilst firms promote self-regulation as an efficient 
means of producing public goods.  
 
In the case of lobbying, self-regulation is often a way of avoiding scrutiny, or setting the terms by 
which corporate lobbying will be scrutinized. For example, from a legal perspective, Simon (2006) 
argues that the food industry in the US cannot be trusted to self-regulate its marketing to children, 
adding that federal government advisory groups are dominated by the industry. From an economic 
perspective, Maxwell and colleagues (2000, p. 583) approve of “strategic self-regulation” that 
preempts political action. Public affairs associations frequently develop their own codes of lobbying 
conduct (e.g., SEAP, 2009). Management academics are frequently critical of self-regulation 
initiatives, particularly when they are poorly conceived (e.g., King & Lenox, 2000; Lenox & Nash, 
2003). Short & Toffel’s (2010, p. 362) research acknowledges that self-regulatory structures can 
promote the internalization of norms, and argues that there is a clear normative component in firms’ 
adoption of self-regulatory instruments, but finds that self-regulation can also “serve as vehicles for 
circumventing, and even undermining, the core values that animate law.” In this respect, we note 
Rasche’s (2010) work on the question of CSR standards and standardization, which focuses 
particularly on the limitations of standardization, and illustrates the difficulties inherent in seeking 
standardized approaches to responsible lobbying. The relevant questions from a responsible 
lobbying perspective are therefore, ‘What is the role of responsible corporate lobbying in designing 
                                                 
5 These are typically seen as examples of business responsibility, given that voluntary commitments go beyond existing 
legislation.  
 the specific way in which self-regulation will work; and is the outcome of greater social value than 
if no industry lobbyists were to participate (and how can that be assessed)?’ Skepticism of self-
regulation (e.g., AccountAbility & The Global Compact, 2005; Caulkin & Collins, 2003) usually 
reflects assumptions about the power without responsibility that firms can thereby acquire (Prakash, 
2000, p. 184). From this perspective, transparency has been considered a necessary complement to 
self-regulation.  
 
Transparency 
The final of the four lenses through which responsible lobbying is addressed in the literature is 
transparency. Transparency and self-regulation are conceptually distinct, but closely related. That is, 
much self-regulation involves some form of commitment to transparency.   
 
As one commentator put it: “the problem is not the lobbying: it is the secrecy” (Wright, 2011). 
Transparency is thus promoted by civil society (AccountAbility & The Global Compact, 2005; e.g., 
Caulkin & Collins, 2003; SustainAbility & WWF, 2005). Transparency International, a civil society 
organization, equates transparency with freedom from corruption, and provides a review of 
lobbying regulation across Europe with the intention of promoting greater lobbying transparency 
(Mulcahy, 2015). Put colloquially, transparency seems a promising way for civil society to “keep 
the bastards honest” (see Lidberg, 2006, p. 9). Most transparency recommendations with respect to 
lobbying involve two mechanisms: a register of lobbyists (e.g., Lock & Seele, 2016, p. 425) and/or 
publication of financial flows.  
 
Technological developments over the past few decades have undoubtedly enhanced transparency’s 
promise. On the other hand, corporations can use transparency as a means of increasing legitimacy. 
For example, the World Business Council for Sustainable Development names transparency one of 
the “basic prerequisites for successful business and sustainable development” (WBCSD, n.d.). 
Transparency is also popular with government and state actors (e.g., OECD, 2010). Indeed, the 
 scale of that popularity is illustrated by Bauer’s finding (2017, p. 209, also p. 210, Table 17) that 
transparency is by far the most likely aspect to be seen as important in responsible lobbying. Its 
popularity suggests that transparency has become an appraisive concept (Bernstein, 2012; see Billet, 
2007).  Birchall (2011) traces the moral discourse of transparency to the Enlightenment. Arellano-
Gault and Lepore (2011) offer a compelling explanation of transparency’s contemporary appeal. 
The purpose of transparency, they argue, is to generate “greater confidence in governmental 
decision-making and informed discussion on political issues that may lead to more effective policy 
design” (idem., p. 1030). Transparency is easily the single most commonly-occurring practitioner-
element of the perspectives on responsible lobbying outlined in this paper. Any overview of 
perspectives on lobbying and the responsible firm must therefore address transparency. Though 
there has yet to be a thorough analysis of transparency in lobbying (though see Naurin, 2007; 
Mulcahy, 2015), we raise two general difficulties with using transparency in the context of 
responsible lobbying. 
 
First, we are skeptical of calls for transparency. We argue that such calls undermine trust in politics 
more generally, echoing Michael Power’s (1997) clear critique of the audit society, of which 
transparency is a constituent element. Auditing, he argues, is part of a “broader politics of fear and 
anxiety” (p. 138), and is designed to produce comfort (p. 123), yet which can result in “less actual 
control” (p. 141). As such, transparency can be seen as a repression of secrecy in order to generate 
accountability. Yet, there is a clear relationship between secrecy and transparency, and there is a 
long tradition of hiding information in plain view (Phillips, 2011). Indeed, a certain amount of 
secrecy is arguably essential (Horn, 2011), and one could even argue that transparency untrammeled 
can act as a totalitarian tool (Boothroyd, 2011). For these reasons, Birchall (2011, p. 18, emphasis in 
original) refers to the “indissoluble relationship between transparency and secrecy.” Moreover, 
transparency typically assumes a linear model of communication that ignores complexity, leading to 
opacity in the midst of transparency policies (Fenster, 2006, pp. 915 ff.). This is particularly acute in 
the case of big data, which Galloway (2011) argues is causing informational opacity. Moving to 
 corporations specifically, Schipper and Boje (2008, p. 510) argue that, while transparency is 
considered to support virtue, “being too transparent might put integrity in jeopardy.” We find their 
maxim compelling: “openness if suitable, transparency when necessary and integrity always” (ibid. 
p. 522). In short, there are good reasons for being wary of over-estimating the potential for 
transparency to promote accountability. We therefore suggest that calls for greater transparency in 
lobbying are to be understood symbolically, in line with attempts to gain/retain legitimacy. 
 
Secondly, we note that transparency in lobbying is poorly-specified. It is not clear what should be 
transparent, nor how it is to be usefully achieved. One can conceive of various kinds of 
transparency. For example, financial transparency would address the flow of money in the political 
environment. Such transparency is unobjectionable and is widely-practiced, but is more suited to 
policing corruption in wider CPA than to ensuring responsible lobbying. Further conceptual work 
on transparency in lobbying is therefore needed before transparency can be theoretically-useful or 
operationally-meaningful.  
 
We have so far provided a thematic overview of the literature on lobbying and the responsible firm, 
showing four lenses: ethical frameworks, deliberative perspectives, self-regulation and 
transparency. These overlap to some extent, but are conceptually distinct. We are now in a position 
to populate the conceptual framework originally presented in Table 1: see Table 3. The normative 
perspectives address lobbying directly, whereas the practical mechanisms inform both lobbying and 
the manner in which lobbying is conceptualized. The four components address different aspects 
relevant to lobbying: content, process, organization, and external environment. Of these, two – 
content and process – principally address the act of lobbying. The other two components – 
organization and external environment – are more concerned with the context within which 
lobbying occurs. We have labeled this bifurcation, “aspect of lobbying”, to indicate the clear 
distinction in focus within the literature. Based on our review, we now propose a preliminary 
research agenda, locating the two main elements of that agenda in our conceptual framework. 
  
Table 3: Typology of lobbying and the responsible firm: Populated with existing literature 
and locating the research agenda within the typology 
Typology of 
responsible 
lobbying 
 
Components 
 
Content Process Organization 
External 
environment 
Orientation 
Normative 
focus 
Ethical 
Frameworks 
e.g., Ostas 2007 
 
 
Focus in 
Research 
Agenda: 
Externalities 
perspective 
Ethical 
Frameworks 
e.g.,  
Weber 1997 
 
 
Focus in 
Research 
Agenda: 
Externalities 
perspective 
Deliberative 
Perspective 
e.g., Anastasiadis 
2014 
 
 
Focus in 
Research 
Agenda: 
Discursive 
approaches 
 
Deliberative 
Perspective 
e.g., Lock & 
Seele 2016 
 
 
Focus in 
Research 
Agenda: 
Discursive 
approaches 
Practical 
mechanisms 
Self-regulation 
e.g., Maxwell et 
al. 2000 
 
Transparency 
e.g., 
SustainAbility & 
WWF 2005 
 
 
Focus in 
Research 
Agenda: 
Externalities 
perspective 
Self-regulation 
e.g.,  
SEAP 2009 
 
Transparency 
e.g.,  
Mulcahy 2015 
 
 
Focus in 
Research 
Agenda: 
Externalities 
perspective 
Deliberative 
Perspective 
e.g., 
AccountAbility& 
Global Compact 
2005 
 
Self-regulation 
e.g., Short & 
Toffel 2010 
 
 
Focus in 
Research 
Agenda: 
Discursive 
approaches 
Deliberative 
Perspective  
e.g., Bauer 2017 
 
 
Focus in 
Research 
Agenda: 
Discursive 
approaches 
Aspect of lobbying 
Operational lobbying: The 
act of lobbying 
Conditions for lobbying: 
Lobbying context 
Note: the examples of the literature included are those which exemplify the literature in the 
typology, provided for illustrative purposes 
 
  
 
Lobbying on its own terms: A research agenda 
We started this paper by providing a clear conceptualization of lobbying, and developing a working 
definition of responsible lobbying. We then reviewed the literature on lobbying and the responsible 
firm, revealing numerous lacunae in the process. We now propose a research agenda to substantially 
extend existing work on the act of lobbying, and open new areas in lobbying context, in a 
comprehensive, theoretically-sound, and practically-useful manner. The overarching question for 
 this research agenda is, ‘what are the necessary and sufficient conditions to drive, and ensure the 
development of, responsible corporate lobbying?’ Our agenda involves proposing two substantive 
directions for research, followed by several briefly-stated questions for further investigation.  
 
Further work is clearly needed on all aspects of responsible lobbying, yet our review indicates that 
some areas are in greater need than others. This is particularly the case with the contextual 
components; both because there is comparatively little work in this area, and because the context 
informs both lobbying content and process. The first of our two main suggested directions revolves 
around discursive approaches, and is relevant to normative work in the context of both 
organizations and the political arena. The second avenue of exploration is around the internalization 
of external costs, and is relevant to both operational aspects of lobbying (content and process), as 
well as to the lobbying context. We emphasize that these two main avenues are a useful starting 
point for further work: even with the addition of our subsequent questions, we make no claim to 
completeness. 
 
Context: Discursive approaches 
There is a view emerging in the CSR literature that Habermas’s deliberative approach can fruitfully 
be developed for responsible lobbying. We note that that such an agenda is part of a wider 
‘deliberative turn’ evident in democracy theory since the 1990s (Dryzek, 2000, p. 1), as well as 
being compatible with variations on the stakeholder approach.  
 
However, we would resist the temptation to rely too heavily on Habermas, as others appear to have 
done; hence our choice of ‘discursive’ rather than ‘deliberative’. As Dryzek (2000, p. v) notes, the 
two terms have come to be used interchangeably. There is nonetheless a difference, with 
‘discursive’ having the following three connotations which he argues makes it a superior term (ibid., 
pp. v-vi): it is social and inter-subjective rather than purely personal; it allows for a range of 
communication, rather than merely calm and reasoned argument; and it connotes both Habermas’s 
 discourse ethic (freeing) and Foucault’s concern that discourse is constraining, in that it “conditions 
the way people think” (ibid., p. vi). We consider applying this discursive element – steeped in the 
Habermasian perspective, but influenced also by Foucault – to be useful for responsible lobbying, 
as it is more congruent with observed practice than a ‘pure’ Habermasian perspective.  
 
According to Dryzek (2000, pp. 8ff), the deliberative turn in democracy theory has two starting 
points: liberal constitutionalism and critical theory. This latter is associated with Habermas, whose 
views have changed over time. Although Dryzek laments this change (ibid., pp. 20-30), it is 
precisely such later work that Scherer and Palazzo (2007) draw on – labeling it ‘Habermas2’ to 
distinguish it from his earlier work – and which is influencing CSR researchers. Habermas’s 
normative model (1998, p. 239ff), which he terms “deliberative politics,” is particularly attractive 
for management theorists. This is because it charts a pragmatic, process-oriented middle course 
between liberal and republican conceptions, integrating them “into the concept of an ideal 
procedure for deliberation and decision making” (ibid., p. 246).  
 
Deliberation is a collective social process, allowing for “unruly and contentious communication” 
(Dryzek, 2000, p. vi) in solving conflicts. Because it is process-oriented, “the product will not 
generally be consensus” (ibid., p. 17; see also Gutmann & Thompson, 2004), and the process does 
not necessarily “culminate in a ‘unified public will’” (Dryzek, 2000, p. 17). This makes it well-
suited to the (Western) political arena, with its many different perspectives. Habermas’s view of 
deliberative politics is based on his two-part discourse ethic (e.g., Habermas, 1990, 1998, pp. 41–
42). Corporate publications are now careful to stress the notion of collaboration, perhaps as a means 
of generating moral legitimacy (cf. Palazzo & Scherer, 2006). There are therefore sound practical – 
as well as theoretical – reasons to engage in some form of discursive approach.  
 
In many respects, a political environment can be considered to have its own culture (e.g., Reich, 
1998, portrays Washington, D.C. as a one-company town), distinct from the cultures of lobbyists’ 
 ‘home organizations’. As such, it can be expected to have its own norms, which sit alongside formal 
regulation of the lobbying process. Such norms have developed over time and reflect the exercise of 
power (see Vallentin & Murillo, 2012, p. 827). Researchers could usefully uncover the norms 
intrinsic to a given policymaking environment, using discursive tools to do so. That is,  
instead of asking the usual instrumental questions of measurement and effect, we see 
a need to penetrate the polished surface of programmatic statements and official 
self-evaluations… and look into the networked and ‘messy’ micro-processes of 
programs and the technological setups to find out how [deliberative approaches in 
lobbying] actually works (Vallentin & Murillo, 2012, p. 837) 
 
 
Singer (2013) would support Vallentin and Murillo’s view: in his recent paper integrating CSR, 
CPA and competitive strategy theories, Singer draws particular attention to the need to set out a 
company’s political assumptions. There has been some work on companies’ assumptions 
(Anastasiadis, 2014), but it remains an under-researched area. Frynas and Yamahaki (2016) make a 
similar point to Singer in their recent review of the CSR literature, particularly emphasizing both the 
significance of examining company-internal drivers of CSR, and the paucity of such work. The present 
paper adds strength to such calls call for more work on understanding the assumptions and drivers 
of companies’ policies and actions.  
 
Moreover, as researchers like Lock and Seele (2016, pp. 424-425; see also Bauer, 2015) have 
pointed out, there are likely to be conditions both external and internal to a firm that can impede its 
ability to engage in responsible lobbying. A discursive approach can help in both of these aspects. 
For example, one external barrier is “the difficulty of including heterogenous actors” (Lock & 
Seele, 2016, p. 425). Engaging in a discursive process would be one way in which actors in the 
political environment could generate the norms to be followed in the lobbying process 
(Habermasian) whilst also taking the differential power of the individual participants into account 
(Foucauldian). Research could usefully explore the necessary boundary conditions for such a 
process. If followed, that process would not guarantee responsible lobbying, but would substantially 
 advance progress towards achievement of two of the four aspects of our definition of responsible 
lobbying: process and environment. 
However, we argue that a discursive approach also requires caution. Baysinger (1984, p. 249) notes 
that the objective of lobbying is to influence “legislative/regulatory processes so that the outcomes 
of those processes better reflect the internal goals of the organization (primarily economic).” His 
work reminds us of the potential economic significance of policy outcomes, reflecting Whelan’s 
(2012) admonition about firms’ need for profit. It is thus to be expected that corporate lobbyists face 
significant pressure to achieve favorable outcomes through lobbying, which may encourage actions 
that would not meet approval in a marketplace. We are therefore not confident that lobbyists and 
their employers can be persuaded in practice to engage in even a ‘Habermas2’ deliberative process, 
which requires such conditions to be met as absence of deception. This is particularly the case, 
given widespread corporate resistance to governmental ‘interference’. 
 
Consequently, we suggest that any discursive approach to responsible lobbying will need to attend 
to the effects of power and dominant discourses, as well as of entrenched practices, within the 
political arena. Further, we note that firms are not uniform organizations, and that it is difficult to 
expect a company lobbyist to participate in a discursive process in the policymaking environment 
without paying attention also to company-internal processes, discourses and power-distribution. 
That is, we posit that a corporate lobbyist may face two competing sets of rules. We therefore 
suggest that Foucault’s analytical tools (1991, 1994; see Gordon, 1994) will be indispensable to 
discursive work. Governmentality is a form of institutionalized power for socially integrating actors 
into a given organizational system (such as the political environment or the individual firm) in a 
predictable manner (e.g., Kromidha et al., 2017.). Recent work on governmentality in governmental 
approaches to CSR (Vallentin & Murillo, 2012, notably pp. 830-833) and Dean’s (2010) four 
analytics of governmentality – visibility, techne, episteme and identity – provide an excellent guide 
to how research in this area might proceed. For example, episteme is about forms of knowledge that 
might include professional standards such as codes of conduct, and the techne analytic refers to 
 technical ways (e.g., specific language or procedures) by which an evolving regime (e.g. ways of 
lobbying) can be enabled and created.  
 
For researchers, a discursive approach thus suggests a range of processual questions congruent with 
wider concerns about the context within which lobbying occurs. How do individual lobbyists 
balance the varying demands of their employers and the policymaking environment? Which 
discourses have the greatest power in the policymaking arena (what Foucault might call the 
“politics of truth”; see Ashenden & Owen, 1999, p. 9), and what epistemological assumptions 
underlie such discourses? What mechanisms might be in place to reach decisions on the processes 
for establishing the basis for responsible lobbying? Answering such questions would provide 
theoretical and practical guidance on both processes for responsible lobbying and an enabling 
environment.  
 
We suggest that research to answer such questions needs to be highly-granular, with data collected 
from ethnographic study, interviews, and/or participant observation being more likely to render 
robust results than survey data. We also see focus groups as a potentially-fruitful, if under-utilized 
method (see Cowton & Downs, 2015). Our suggestion is congruent with researchers’ experience 
(McWilliams, Siegel, & Wright, 2006; e.g., Rehbein & Schuler, 1999), which suggests that gaining 
access to meaningful data may be unusually challenging, so that small-scale research may in any 
case be a pragmatic necessity. We would add that researchers should not be nervous of engaging in 
well-crafted small-sample research; generalization from case study research is respectable under 
certain conditions (Tsang, 2014). Our suggestions are in line with recent calls for greater 
methodological diversity within management research (e.g., Klag & Langley, 2013; Scherbaum & 
Meade, 2013). 
 
 
 
 Externalities perspective 
We note that the policymaking environment is dominated by arguments of a rational-economic 
nature. We note also that firms’ professed CSR principles can often be summarized as a statement of 
intent to avoid creating external costs (see also Vigneau, Humphreys & Moon, 2015). In addition to 
suggesting a discursive approach, we therefore propose exploring whether responsible lobbying 
could be fruitfully addressed through attention to internalization of external costs. That is, it may be 
useful to pay attention to arguments about who is to bear the costs of corporate actions. Such an 
approach would channel the normative pressure on a firm to pursue its internal goals, without 
seeking outcomes that compromise the social good.  
 
The external costs of business activity can be substantial, so even modest success in reducing them 
could generate significant benefits for society; for example, the estimated cost of industrial air 
pollution to the European Union was at least Eur.102Bn in 2009 (EEA, 2011, p. 8). Internalizing 
external costs is well-understood as a way to “rectify market failures” (Arrow, 1973, p. 303), and 
Crouch has argued that CSR should be seen as “essentially ‘corporate externality recognition’” 
(2006, p. 1534). There has even been some suggestion that firms should promote internalization of 
external costs through their lobbying efforts (Vogel, 2005, 2008), though the literature is silent on 
how this would be achieved. Most importantly, a focus on externalities changes the nature of the 
debate on responsible lobbying, creating normative pressure that uses the language of public policy.  
 
For researchers, this means asking questions about content. For example, to what extent do 
companies take externalities into account in their analyses, to what extent do they provide such 
information to policymakers, and to what extent do they resist or welcome policies that seek to 
internalize externalities? With respect to organizations, researchers might usefully compare firms 
that have integrated their lobbying and CSR function closely into the company with those that view 
lobbying as separate function. There have been recent calls for integration between functions in 
pursuit of responsible lobbying (e.g., Bauer, 2016; den Hond et al, 2014; Lock & Seele, 2016), and 
 such research would provide an empirical test of the efficacy of such organization-internal 
arrangements in promoting responsible lobbying.  
 
Doing so with a focus on externalities is useful: pragmatically, participants in the policymaking 
environment seem likely to raise the question of externalities anyway, and focusing on externalities 
is a way for firms to show, measurably, congruence between their CSR policies, societal concerns, 
and lobbying on issues that are material to them.  We are of course aware that there are well-known 
risks associated with taking an economic approach to research in this area (e.g., Prasad & Elmes, 
2005). Moreover, it remains possible for firms to adopt the language of externalities whilst 
nevertheless engaging in a dishonest manner with other political actors. Nonetheless, we consider it 
worth further investigation, particularly in conjunction with the previous research stream. In this 
respect, we note that Francés-Gómez and colleagues (2015) have proposed a promising perspective 
on the use of experimental economics, which may prove fruitful.  
 
Moreover, such an approach could open up space for questions about how firms approach their own 
internal decision-making with respect to lobbying; this is useful for a discursive perspective also, as 
we argue above. How exactly would research proceed? In the first instance, seek firms that take 
such an approach already. In the second instance, perhaps laboratory studies or role-play, or even 
A/B testing of specific arguments, both with respect to the integration of lobbying within the firm 
and efficacy of argumentation in the political environment. An externalities perspective has the 
potential to substantially advance the content and organization aspects of our definition of 
responsible lobbying.  
 
To conclude this section, we raise two further general questions. The more wide-ranging of these is 
about lobbying content and the materiality of issues (see AccountAbility and The Global Compact, 
2005). For example, consider public policymaking on tobacco advertising rules and on the specific 
shape of wing-mirrors required for type-approval of heavy goods vehicles. Whilst the significance 
 of the lobbying process is arguably equally important in both policy examples, the salience of the 
content aspect arguably varies greatly, in direct proportion to the potential impact on society and the 
companies involved. The general question is, therefore: what are the implications for responsible 
lobbying of the materiality of a policy issue? A sub-question is around how firms decide on the 
division of labor; to what extent they will engage in lobbying themselves, and to what extent they 
will proceed via third-party actors (e.g. consultants).  The rise of corporate political advocacy 
(Wettstein & Baur, 2016) suggests this may become an increasingly urgent question. Finally, this 
paper addresses the topic of responsible lobbying: is irresponsible lobbying the binary opposite, or 
can one conceive of a spectrum? Further conceptual work on ‘irresponsible lobbying’ may prove 
fruitful. 
 
Methodologically, this work comes with numerous challenges. For example, qualitative research 
such as interviews or ethnography can provide extremely rich data, but the nature of corporate 
lobbying means it can be unusually challenging to gain access to research site(s). By contrast, 
academics wishing to undertake quantitative research on responsible lobbying may find such work 
especially challenging, not least because of the difficulty in finding a meaningful dependent 
variable to measure. One area to start with would be to better understand the relationship between 
corporate lobbying and changing levels of external costs associated with specific industries. That 
may require a degree of methodological innovation. We note that the above methodological 
considerations have significant implications for the pace at which the empirical research is likely to 
be able to be conducted. There is therefore a danger that this research agenda is attractive only to 
tenured faculty. Pragmatically, moments of particularly significant public policy debate may 
provide serendipitous opportunities for speedier research.  
 
Conclusion 
We have differentiated between lobbying and CPA, provided definitions of lobbying and 
responsible lobbying, and have developed a working model of responsible lobbying (Table 1; 
 expanded in Table 3), based on the four components of our definition of responsible lobbying. We 
then reviewed the extant literature on lobbying and the responsible firm, differentiating between 
literature on the act of lobbying and that addressing the context within which lobbying takes place. 
This allowed us a tabular overview, showing areas of greater and lesser coverage and detail. One 
feature of the literature was the presence of relevant practice-oriented perspectives. Following our 
review, we made suggestions for a research agenda that provides a starting point for a 
comprehensive model of responsible lobbying. This centered on two directions for urgent attention: 
discursive approaches and an externalities-focus, each with its own set of methodological 
challenges. We also posed a number of further questions. 
 
Goodpaster (2011) warns of a future in which business ethics contains either elegant normative 
theories divorced from practice, or practice-led research with little normative content. We believe 
our paper strikes a middle path between these twin dangers. In so doing, we have made a significant 
contribution to both management and political science scholarship, providing conceptual clarity and 
a fruitful research agenda for responsible lobbying, within a clear and structured conceptual 
framework. 
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